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Looking at the way risk is employed within the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat’s policy of resilience, this article critically examines how contingency is 
managed within contemporary biopolitical security practices seeking to protect and 
promote species-life.  Underlying these changes, it will be argued, are profound 
changes in the way species-life is generally understood in terms of a complex adaptive 
network.  Paying particular attention to how contingency is understood within the 
literature on complex adaptive systems that inform contemporary notions of the 
‘network society’, this article will seek to draw a link between risk and governance 
within the modern ‘network society.’ In doing so, this paper seeks to examine how 
advances in the protocological control of networks are informing biopolitical security 
practices and their relation to the governmental rationality of neo-liberalism. 
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Even the thought of a possibility can shake and transform us; it 
is not merely sensations or particular expectations that do that!  
Note how effective the possibility of eternal damnation was! 
     
      --Friedrich Nietzsche  
 
It has been argued that the eradication, or at least management, of doubt 
is the driving feature of modern reason (Caygill, 1993). Indeed, the desire 
to render the future fully knowable has offered a fleeting horizon for both 
the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations whose 
emphasis on predictive capacity has been perpetually challenged by the 
force of uncertain global events (cf. Gaddis, 1992: 5-58).  Indeed the 
recent incorporation of complexity models into theories of social (De 
Landa, 2006; Urry, 2003) and historical processes (De Landa, 1997) pose 
a considerable challenge to attempts to uncover timeless, universal laws 
upon which the unfolding of history and politics could be understood and 
ultimately controlled.  Rather these theories stress the contingency and 
non-linear evolutionary properties of complex systems, such as social 
systems. This article examines how these understandings are shaping 
the contemporary security environment. 
 
Focusing on the policy of resilience conducted by the United Kingdom’s 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat, this article will trace the relationship 
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between an emerging ontopolitical conceptualisation of society in terms of 
a complex adaptive system, and efforts to manage contingency politically.  
Resilience represents a novel security strategy that recognizes the 
importance of preparatory measures within a contingent security 
environment.  Resilience, defined as the capacity to bounce-back from 
external shocks, seeks to secure society from unpredictable systemic 
shocks by improving the evolutionary capacity, or “fitness,” of the 
population.  Thus far resilience has been primarily directed at the rapid 
regeneration and repair of critical infrastructures in the wake of a crisis 
within the UK; however these strategies are increasingly being 
operationalised in Europe as a result of European Union initiatives to 
create a common policy on European critical infrastructure protection 
(Burgess, 2007).  
 
This paper will proceed firstly by examining the development of novel 
conceptualizations of society which stress its contingency and place 
emphasis on its ontological emergence.  Secondly this paper will quickly 
examine the biopolitical implications of resilience as a novel security 
policy geared towards the promotion and protection of emergent life.  
Finally, this paper will examine the political consequences of the focus on 
contingency within these biopolitical security techniques through an 
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examination of how political imaginaries of catastrophe are being 
operationalised within discourses of risk to improve the resilience of 
British society.  In doing so this article is principally concerned with 
shedding light on the relationship between arts of governance and the 
history of systems of expertise with respect to the evolution of security 
practices and politics in general. 
 
The network society as a biopolitical object of security 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was established in July 2001—three 
months prior to the September 11th attacks in Washington D.C. and New 
York City—with the aim of improving UK preparedness in the event of an 
emergency, be it environmental, viral or terrorist.  While the terrorist 
attacks in Britain and the United States since that time have no doubt 
played a significant role in the advance of these new technologies, a 
quote from Bruce Mann, Director of the Civil Contingencies at the Cabinet 
Office, attests to the changing notions of “life” that have inspired the form 
of these new technologies: 
 
There has, since 2001, been a fundamental shift in the 
purpose and organisation of civil protection in the UK. The 
Cold War model of civil defence – focused on a single, 
monolithic threat, managed top-down by central government 
in secret and restricted to a small community – has gone. In 
its place has come a model better suited to a modern 
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network society with its increased connections and 
interdependencies bringing with them greater vulnerability to 
external shock. The new model addresses a wide range of 
security risks, from terrorism through accidents to natural 
disasters. It involves a broad range of organisations, in the 
public sector and beyond. Work at local level is the building 
block of preparedness. And there is a premium on 
inclusiveness and transparency (Mann, 2007). 
 
 
As the above statement makes clear, the introduction of the security 
strategy of resilience has less to do with the changing nature of threats in 
the contemporary security environment, and more to do with the changing 
organisational structure of life within advanced liberal societies; the need 
to adjust security technologies to the protection of the modern “network 
society”. Coinciding with the advances in the quality of life that 
international telecommunications networks and just-in-time transportation 
networks have delivered to advanced liberal societies has been the 
intensification of certain threats suggesting that these complex networks 
have also made modern life increasingly vulnerable. The same networks 
relied upon by advanced liberal societies for a high standard of living are 
being exploited by other networked communities from viruses (both 
electronic and organic) to international terrorists who threaten to 
destabilise the contingent amalgamation of networks that contribute to the 
“quality of life” experienced in advanced liberal societies.  The modern 
“network society”, it is said, is in desperate need of novel solutions, which 
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take into consideration society’s changing form, to protect it from these 
threats. 
 
Here, the network society refers not only to the proliferation of 
communications, transportation and infrastructural networks which 
support modern life in advanced liberal states; it refers to the complex 
myriad of network structures through which advanced liberal societies are 
organised, supported and composed.  The idea of the network society is 
related to, but goes beyond, the notion of the information society, which 
stresses the growing size and importance of information flows to 
contemporary societies (Webster, 2006), to emphasize the organisational 
structure of advanced liberal societies in terms of a complex of interlinked 
and interdependent networks (Berkowitz and Wellman, 1988; Castells, 
1996).  At a macro-level this refers to the co-evolution of economics, 
information technology and business practices that have produced the 
interdependent social and economic networks of globalised capitalism in 
the twenty-first century.  It also refers to the complex network of critical 
infrastructures that support modern day societies and which are 
responsible for the “quality of life” experienced in advanced liberal 
societies (Collier and Lakoff, 2008: 33-35).  Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, it reflects a profound cognitive shift to network tropes and 
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informatic metaphors in understandings of “life itself”, that are manifest 
within a vast array of discourses surrounding the “life properties” 
displayed by complex systems (Galloway and Thacker, 2007; Kay, 2000; 
Rose, 2007).  
 
This new understanding of society poses a number of conceptual, and 
thus political, problems for the biopolitical security dispositif1 charged with 
protecting and promoting species-life (Foucault, 1998: 143). Simply put, 
security is always directed towards the securing of a referent object 
(Dillon, 2007: 10-11). Indeed the way in which these objects are 
problematised through different discourses of danger give rise to different 
technologies and rationalities involved with their government (Dillon, 
2007: 10). The emerging ontopolitical understanding of society contained 
within the idea of the ‘network society’ would thus be expected to have an 
effect on the techniques of governance which seek to promote and 
protect it.  To understand the emergence of resilience as a security 
practice is thus firstly to understand how the ‘network society’ is 
understood and problematised within the contemporary security climate. 
 
                                         
1  I use ‘dispositif; here to preserve the connotations held within the French term including 
‘disposition’ and ‘arrangement’ that are excluded within English translations of the term as 
‘apparatus’ or ‘device.’ 
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Unlike the fairly static conception of a society composed of bounded 
groups in hierarchical organisational structures, the ontopolitical 
representation of network-life is complicated by the very dynamism of 
networks themselves. Mathematical renderings within graph theory are 
forced to prioritise the spatial over the temporal elements of these 
complex, adaptive networks, providing a snapshot at any given time of 
the contingent network, but fail to register the most important element: 
namely, the dynamism of the system itself (Galloway and Thacker, 2007: 
34). While contingency may be a problematic feature for taxonomy, it is a 
vital property of any species insofar as it is a mark of a species’ ability to 
adapt to changes in its environment through evolution.  The contingency 
inherent within any complex system, including living species and human 
societies, precludes fixed taxonomies based on ontological 
characteristics, and instead suggests an ontological understanding of life 
as emergent. 
 
Emergent life, from human populations to viral communities, is defined as 
an ‘adaptive and emergent process of non-linear adaptation and change’ 
(Dillon, 2007: 11).  Here, the continuous circulation of information, such 
as the genetic information contained within DNA, is paramount to any 
living system. The realisation of “life itself” in turn is dependent upon a 
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certain critical threshold of connectivity through which vital information is 
exchanged and above which self-emergence is made possible (Dillon and 
Reid, 2001: 43). Contingency within these living systems is recognised as 
a vital systemic property permitting the establishment of recombinatory 
forms of organisation necessary for the continued circulation of vital 
information in the event of a systemic shock.   
 
Ironically, the same design elements that contribute to a system’s 
capacity to maximise circulation, namely its dynamism or complexity, 
make control of these systems difficult, if not impossible to obtain without 
detrimentally affecting it. In other words, the conceptualisation of species-
life in terms of an open and adaptive system precludes prophylactic 
security strategies. Indeed the fitness of any system is dependent upon 
its ability to interact with its environment.  Instead these systems are 
secured through their contingency, by focusing on optimising the systems 
ability to respond to threats by evolving over or beyond them (Dillon, 
2006).  Optimising a system’s capacity to evolve over external shocks, 
thus maximising a system’s fitness, is referred to as engendering 
resilience (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 43-45). 
 
Political Perspectives 2008 Vol 3(1)  
 
 10 
The contingency of species-life and the correlative study of its complex 
adaptive behaviour thus respectively provide a target and an epistemic 
base for biopolitical interventions aimed at the security of British society. 
The next section will trace how these understandings are being applied 
within the contemporary UK security environment through the strategy of 
resilience. 
 
Resilience and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was established in July 2001 within 
the core executive of the British Cabinet Office and charged with 
coordinating responses to national emergencies such as Y2K, the fuel tax 
protest and the foot-and-mouth outbreak that had disturbed British life 
over the previous year and a half (Dillon, 2005: 1).  Operating upon a 
novel security strategy of resilience, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
was responsible for addressing the challenges to British society arising 
from the exponential increase in the circulation of people, money, ideas, 
goods, services, diseases and information that accompanied neo-liberal 
globalisation. Three months after its establishment, the events of 
September 11th 2001 propelled international terrorism to the fore of the 
post-Cold War security discourse and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
was quickly absorbed into Britain’s national anti-terrorism strategy (Dillon, 
2005). 
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As a security strategy, resilience differs markedly from prophylactic forms 
of security primarily concerned with thwarting an attack. Instead, 
engendering resilience into the social and infrastructural networks that 
animate species-life directs attention to the performative adaptability of 
these networks to withstand, re-route and recombine in the wake of a 
potentially catastrophic event to maintain systemic operability.  Here, 
security does not refer to the absence of danger but rather the ability of a 
society to quickly and efficiently reorganise to rebound from a potentially 
catastrophic strike. As the primary threats to modern liberal life 
increasingly take on the organisational form of the network to operate 
within (exploiting) and upon (targeting) the complex networks sustaining 
the life of advanced liberal societies, then biopolitical governance is 
increasingly directed towards the realisation of a logistical life in these 
societies based on models of the most resilient of “living networks” (Reid, 
2006).2 
 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat describes resilience as promoting 
“the ability to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disruptive 
                                         
2 Cf. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Fight Networks with Networks,” 
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.12.01/fullalert.html#networks accessed: 
July 3, 2008. 
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challenges”.3  As a security policy, concerned with enhancing the ability of 
a society to rebound after a crisis, resilience is primarily focused on 
optimising the conditions required for the quick and efficient emergency 
response to any disruption in the provision of community services and 
resources deemed “essential of life”.4 As a result, resilience is directed at 
two levels: the first being to optimise the operational conditions for 
emergency response units; and the second to locate and secure the 
essential services required at the societal level.   
 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is not directly involved with the 
direction of an emergency response, but instead seeks to optimise the 
conditions necessary for self-sufficiency and the emergent self-
organisation of emergency units in the event of a crisis.5 Similarly, the 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat is concerned with encouraging 
businesses and individuals to develop their own contingency plans so as 
to engender resilience within the private sector.  As Bruce Mann, the 
                                         
3 “Capabilities Programme” UK Resilience 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ukgovernment/capabilities.aspx accessed 31, 
August 2008 
4 Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A short guide (revised) available 
online at 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/~/media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/15mayshortguide%20pd
f.ashx accessed 31 August 2008. 
5 The status of emergency units is outlined within the Civil Contingencies act as follows:  
Category One responders are classified as those organizations at the core of the response to 
most emergencies (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies).  Category Two 
organisations (e.g. Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are "co-
Political Perspectives 2008 Vol 3(1)  
 
 13 
Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, puts it, “[o]ur approach is to 
enable and to encourage”.6 In seeking to enhance society’s capacity for 
self-repair and regeneration, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat is 
directed towards optimising the conditions of possibility for an emergent 
emergency response within all sectors of society following a systemic 
shock. 
 
To compliment the sophisticated horizon scanning technologies of the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, relied upon to anticipate future shocks, resilience is 
being trained into British society through the use of disaster simulations as 
mandated within The Civil Contingencies Act Regulations with the stated 
purpose of “helping participants develop confidence in their skills and providing 
experience of what it would be like to use the plan's procedures in a real 
event”.7 Exercises are built around a wide range of challenges from natural 
disasters8 to viral pandemics9 to acts of terrorism10, and have in the past been 
                                                                                                                       
operating bodies" that are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be 
heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. 
6 Bruce Mann, ‘Protecting the UK’s critical national infrastructure’, Contingency Today, 
http://www.contingencytoday.com/online_article/Protecting-the-UK_s-Critical-National-
Infrastructure/416 accessed: 18 August 2008. 
7 ‘Exercises’ UK Resilience, http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises.aspx 
accessed: 17 August 2008. 
8 cf. ‘Exercise “Triton”’ UK Resilience  (conducted June-July 2004,) 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/triton.aspx 
accessed: 17 August 2008.   
9 cf. ‘Exercise “Winter Willow”’ UK Resilience (conducted 30 January & 19-20 February 2007) 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/winter_willow.aspx, 
‘Exercise “Hawthorn”’ UK Resilience (conducted 5 April 2005) 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/control/contingency/hawthorn/index.htm 
‘Exercise “Aurora”’ UK Resilience (conducted September 2005) 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/aurora.aspx all 
accessed: 17 August 2008.   
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conducted in international joint operations with supranational organizations 
including the G8, NATO, the EU, as well as on a bilateral basis.11 
 
Instead of relying on rigid protocol, these exercises aim to promote self-
sufficiency in the rapid convergence and emergent self-organisation of 
emergency units in the advent of a crisis. The capacity to adapt to unforeseen 
challenges is prioritised over the capacity to develop a single, all-encompassing 
plan for these challenges in advance (Dillon, 2005). These exercises seek to 
psychologically prepare emergency responders for real crises by simulating 
experiences that will build personal and team confidence, and give them 
experience in making real time decisions. Engendering resilience, however, 
also relies heavily on the imagination of those responsible for setting up the 
simulation itself, so that emergency units are continually confronted with a 
variety of “surprises” that will prepare them for the certain uncertainties that 
accompany “real” disaster.  Here we note the convergence of the primarily 
American psychological literature on resilience (Bonanno G.A., 2007; 
Fredrickson, 2003; Kindt, 2006), focusing on the psychological and sociological 
factors that permit certain individuals or societies to cope with trauma, with the 
ideas of resilience dealt with in informatic and socio-ecological literature 
(Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Menth and Martin, 2004; Michael Menth, 2004). 
                                                                                                                       
10 cf. ‘Exercise “Atlantic Blue”’ UK Resilience (conducted April 2005 in joint operation with the 
United States and Canada) 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/atlanticblue.aspx 
accessed: 17 August 2008.  
11 ‘Exercises’ UK Resilience http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises.aspx#live 
accessed: 17 August 2008. 
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Similarly, then, resilience is also built into social systems through 
experience with actual crises and disasters. American literature, for 
instance, has examined the sociological differences between New 
Yorkers and Londoners, following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, in light of the 
psychological resilience built into British society through their historical 
experience with Irish terrorism (Kindt, 2006).  Likewise, 7/7 highlighted 
the need to build resilience into the British telecommunications 
infrastructure (Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office, 2006). 
Interestingly, if resilience is enhanced through “real” disasters, then 
experience with these events is not necessarily completely undesirable—
indeed they are opportunities to enhance resilience and test the 
morphogenetic properties of society. As a result, security becomes 
increasingly directed towards the temporal as opposed to the spatial, as 
the declining capacity for prediction in a complex society necessitates a 
re-formulation of security in terms of engendering the adaptive capacity to 
quickly and efficiently organise in the wake of a disruptive challenge. 
  
These strategies are undoubtedly novel in the field of security, but they 
also reflect a shift in the techniques of governance that are employed in 
advanced liberal societies. Rather than impose top-down control as in a 
hierarchical military structure of defence, the Civil Contingencies 
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Secretariat seeks to promote self-sufficiency amongst emergency 
response units through training and the provision of a resilient 
communications infrastructure that units can depend on to circulate 
information during a crisis. Rather than coordinating the response, the 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat seeks to optimise the conditions 
necessary for the rapid convergence and self-organisation of an 
emergency response. As such, while not making redundant other forms 
of security, security in the “network society” is formulating new strategies 
for the specific challenges encountered by a complex society that take 
advantage of its network form. These changes have associated 
implications for theorising about governmentality in advanced liberal 
societies. 
 
Governance in the age of the network society 
Governmentality refers to the reflexive rationalisation of governmental 
practice that provides a discursive field of power/knowledge through 
which governmental problems are articulated and techniques of 
governance are rendered “thinkable and practicable both to its 
practitioners and to those upon whom [they are] practiced” (Burchell et 
al., 1991: 3). Indeed, the representation of objects of security and the 
problematics that arise through them suggest particular forms of 
intervention or strategies for dealing with them, which do not simply work 
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upon them in a passive and detached manner, but also actively reinforce 
the representation of these objects of governance. Governmentality is 
embodied within the ensemble of institutions, strategies and practices 
that have “the population as its target, political economy as its major form 
of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument” (Foucault, 2007: 108).  In studying the historical evolution of 
governmentality, Foucault emphasised how these “arts of government” 
were constituted by way of a strategic engagement with governmental 
problematics specific to the given period, and how these complex 
relationships, when taken together, established a framework through 
which the boundaries of the political discourse were circumscribed and 
reiterated (Foucault, 2007). 
 
As Foucault stressed, to govern a hierarchically organised group, one 
imposes control in a top-down fashion, with attention paid to the 
production of “docile bodies” through which discipline could have 
maximum effect (Foucault, 1977).  This was the model for the disciplinary 
societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries where governance 
was aimed towards fixing subjects within a homogenous ideal—the 
“norm” (Foucault, 1977).  The advent of the population, with its inherent 
laws and processes of development, required an evolution in 
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governmental technique from the top-down disciplinary governance of 
sovereign power, to forms of governmental intervention directed at the 
population’s “own laws and mechanisms of disturbance” (Foucault, 2007: 
337).  Here, the advent of the network society has not fundamentally 
changed the object of governance, namely society, but has instead 
articulated a very different set of laws governing the dynamics of the 
population.   
 
As Hardt and Negri note, “[t]he same design element that ensures 
survival, decentralisation, is also what makes control of the network so 
difficult” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 299). As contemporary governmental 
strategies shift to cope with the problematisations that arise from this new 
aspeciation of life, they turn to the strategies developed within a diverse 
selection of disciplines that are amenable to the governance of societies, 
newly articulated through informatic tropes. The Civil Contingencies 
Secretariats policy of resilience is indeed composed of an amalgamation 
of strategies which seek to optimise the fitness of society conceptualised 
in terms of a complex adaptive system. While these strategies differ 
considerably from sovereign forms of governance, they do not signify any 
diminishing measure of government in advanced liberal societies as an 
examination of the governmental practices of the Civil Contingencies 
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Secretariat makes clear. Instead, governance is shifting from sovereign, 
top-down methods, to forms of control operating on the conditions of 
possibility of the referent object, which in this case is the species-life of 
society. 
 
Life, articulated in terms of a network, is governed as a network.  
Informatic metaphors used to conceptualise the most basic elements and 
processes of life have encouraged the cross-pollination of ideas between 
a diverse selection of disciplines rooted in systems and complexity 
theory, and the conflation of strategies seeking to act upon these 
processes in the digital and life sciences. In the process, the distinction 
between biological and informatic “life” have become increasingly 
conflated when the most basic elements of life—DNA, RNA—are 
conceptualised and manipulated as code (Kay, 2000; Rose, 2007), when 
information systems are increasingly articulated in biological terms as 
“living systems” (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Galloway and Thacker, 2007), 
and when the threats to these systems not only organise in network form, 
but also operate upon and within the networked infrastructure depended 
upon for the realisation of contemporary liberal life (i.e. computer viruses, 
biological viruses, terrorist networks).  The conflation of these different 
“life forms” is reinforced by, but also encouraging, common modes of 
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governance which seek to operate on the laws and processes inherent to 
these “living systems” as they are commonly articulated in both the 
biological and computational sciences as protocol. 
 
Galloway and Thacker define protocol as “a horizontal, distributed control 
apparatus that guides both the technical and political formation of 
computer networks, biological systems, and other media” (Galloway and 
Thacker, 2007).  Protocol is depended upon to connect and manage the 
relationship between the various networks comprising a complex system. 
As such it is primarily concerned with managing flows of information 
within and between networks.  Protocol is neither imposed “top-down”, as 
in sovereign modes of governance, nor is it a self-imposed, liberating, 
anarchic form of order springing from the “bottom-up” (Galloway and 
Thacker, 2007). Rather protocol is an “immanent expression of control” 
(Galloway and Thacker, 2007): a heterogeneous and distributed form of 
governance seeking to direct the flows of information underlying a 
system, but with an eye to managing the organisational evolution of a 
system.  Put simply, “[p]rotocols serve to provide the condition of 
possibility, and protocological control the means of facilitating that 
condition” (Galloway and Thacker, 2007).  As such protocological control 
is interested in complementing, if not controlling, the conditions of 
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possibility for the realisation of self-regulating order within a system 
(Galloway and Thacker, 2007).   
 
Unlike disciplinary control, protocological control is a distributed form of 
control, given the heterogeneous nature of the layered protocols that govern 
a complex system. The internet, for example, consists of seven layers of 
protocol, made functional through the principle of nesting, whereby higher 
layers encapsulate lower ones, allowing smaller decisions to be preformed 
locally. Upper lays of protocol are thus dependent upon the self-sufficiency 
of lower layers to “do their job”, so that upper layers invoking these lower 
layers can be sure what to expect. The resilience of a system is measured 
in terms of “contingency handling”, which refers to the ability of a network to 
manage and adapt to “sudden, unplanned, or localized changes within 
itself” (Galloway and Thacker, 2007: 61).  As such, protocological control, 
unlike disciplinary control, seeks to optimise the diverse functions of the 
heterogeneous layers of protocol operating within a system. 
 
In recent years, protocol has been developed within biotechnologies to 
interface the “dry” networks of computers, with the “wet” networks of 
biological systems, allowing for the manipulation of organic information by 
computers (Thacker, 2005). In turn, protocological controls are making 
rapid advances in their ability to manipulate and control the most basic 
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processes of life.  Dramatic examples include recent work in guiding the 
morphogenetic properties of stem cells for the creation of more specified 
cells for the purposes of organ regeneration or harvesting (Cooper, 2006; 
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 286-289).  These practices are 
contributing towards an understanding of life as “reprogrammable, 
instrumentalized and networked” (Joel Slayton in Thacker, 2005: x).  
Biopolitical governmentality has, in turn, been inspired by these 
governmental strategies, insofar as they are amenable to species-life 
newly understood as a complex, adaptive system. These sorts of 
techniques are clearly witnessed within the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariats strategy of resilience. 
 
Governmentality, as a reflexive process concerned with how to best to 
govern, is faced with the changing ontopolitical conceptualisation of 
species-life in network form, and seeks to manage the problematisations 
which arise from its governance within the methods of governance that 
allow dynamic and evolving networks to organise and operate.  These 
strategies are clearly evident within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat’s 
policy of resilience that aims to perfect protocological control over the 
emergent properties of species-life. No doubt this is essential for optimising 
the conditions for infrastructural and societal regeneration in the wake of a 
potentially destabilising event, but it is also conducted in recognition that a 
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society capable of evolving over and through moments of contingent crisis 
is also one most prepared to capitalise on positive opportunities (Resilience 
Alliance, 2007: 8). 
 
In seeking to optimise the conditions for self-emergent order, the 
governance characteristic of the “network society” breaks fundamentally 
from top-down models of sovereign governance and instead operates 
through diverse and distributed modes of control typical of network forms of 
organisation. This does not suggest, however, that sovereign forms of 
government are in the process of being replaced entirely. Rather, 
sovereignty is complemented and reconfigured by emerging forms of 
governance which take into consideration the ontopolitical reality of the 
“network society”.  Locating how legal and disciplinary modes of control are 
reconfigured within this emerging “order of the real” is therefore an 
important question for contemporary political theorists.   
 
As the biopolitical governance of the “network society” is increasingly 
directed through the “living networks” said to comprise modern society, then 
the techniques of security begin to resemble the immediate and continuous 
control characteristic of the Deleuze’s “control society” (Deleuze, 1995).  
Here, “ultrarapid forms of free-floating control” operate outside the old 
disciplinary institutions, to be effected continuously and without end 
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(Deleuze, 1995).  Indeed, species-life in the “network society” is made 
amenable to these types of control through risk 
 
Risk and contingency 
While uncertainty has long posed an obstacle for statesmen, its 
understanding has been far from static throughout history. Its 
understanding as fate, or more precisely Machiavelli’s fortuna, was 
radically altered in the wake of Pascal’s discovery of probability which 
allowed chance to be quantified and measured (Hacking, 2006). Risk, in 
turn, commodified chance, allowing it to be bought, sold and thereby 
distributed through market-mechanisms in the form of insurance. As 
such, risk is much more than a particular disposition towards an unknown 
future; it is a social technology for rendering the future knowable and 
actionable, through the accumulation of actuarial statistics (Aradau et al., 
2008: 150). Far from existing prior to the rationalities and technologies 
that reify it, risk is constructed through the practices which attempt to 
tame the uncertainty of the future by making it knowable.  As such, risk is 
not something objective, something that exists prior to the discourses that 
render it understandable, but exists within the myriad of rationalities and 
technologies that mobilise it as a problematic to be governed. In light of 
the developments in biopolitical security practices the question is raised 
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as to how risk is mobilised as an instrument of biopolitical governance for 
societies increasingly conceptualised in terms of their contingency?  
 
The large scale, catastrophic and highly contingent risks faced by the 
“network society” and dealt with by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat are 
extremely difficult to calculate because of their size and low frequency, 
exhausting the actuarial tools usually relied upon to calculate risk which 
require high iterations of an event. Instead, that which is beyond the limit 
of calculability must be approached though imagination, of what could 
possibly happen. As the simulations conducted by the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat exemplify, imagination is increasingly being relied upon, as 
opposed to statistics, in order to reify the future and render it operable. In 
the process risk becomes virtual. Not in the sense that it is not real, but in 
the Deleuzian sense of the: 
 
potentiality that is immanent in every object and every 
situation. Unlike “the possible” which is opposed to the real, 
the virtual is real, which is to say that it exists as concretely in 
the present…a future to come that is already with us, but 
which remains ungraspable (Braun, 2007).    
 
 
The way the future is thought, including what is acknowledged and 
prioritised, has real effects on the present. The way the future is thought 
can therefore lend considerable force towards a particular future that 
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could have been otherwise. Imagining some futures and not others has 
political implications (De Goede, 2008). While the risks dealt with by the 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat are approached through the imagination 
of what could possibly happen, these risks in turn structure the political 
imagination, enabling and constraining decision-making in the present. It 
is the imagination, not of a predicted future, but of a possible future, that 
structures and moulds the techniques and rationalities that comprise the 
contemporary security environment. As these imaginaries proceed to get 
increasingly darker, in order to exhaust the potential for “surprise” 
encountered within an actual crisis, the virtual level of threat, which is 
folded back into the present, increases exponentially, creating a 
persistent feeling of threat in advanced liberal societies. Rather than 
being harmful, however, the persistent articulation of threat is productive 
insofar as it has encouraged the operation of neo-liberal forms of 
governance as articulated by Foucault in his 1979 lecture series The Birth 
of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2004). 
 
Neo-liberalism as a rationality of governance 
 
 In his lecture series, The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault investigates the 
evolution of governmental rationality and techniques characteristic of neo-
liberalism (Foucault, 2004). From the Ordo-liberals of West Germany to 
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the Chicago School, Foucault traced the development of neo-liberalism 
as the extension of market logic to understandings of social behaviour 
and the associated movement of promoting the market form as the 
organisational ideal for both state and society (Foucault, 2004: Ch. 3-4). 
In particular Foucault focused on how neo-liberalism relied upon the 
“responsibilisation” of individuals with respect to the risks they faced. 
Here, prudence entailed treating one’s self as an enterprise with attention 
to one’s own “human capital”. These forms of governance and subjectivity 
are evident within the operational structure of resilience and raise 
interesting questions as to the ways in which neo-liberalism and 
protocological governance are mutually reinforcing in the governance of 
the “network society”. 
 
If neo-liberalism is characterised by the extension of market logics and 
forms of organisation into the social domain, then one must take into 
account the massive changes in economic, governmental and societal 
organisation with respect to the processes of neo-liberal globalisation 
since Foucault’s death in 1984. As Foucault made clear, political 
economy has been a considerable source of governmental knowledge 
given that political economy reflects on how organisation and distribution 
within a society can maximise national prosperity (Foucault, 2004: 13; 
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Foucault, 2007). The globalisation of production is organised within a 
myriad of flexible networks, from supply-chains, to finance to 
telecommunications infrastructure, allowing multinational corporations to 
take advantage of gross differentials in labour between states by 
outsourcing production and many services overseas. The privatisation of 
public services within neo-liberal globalisation is built upon the same logic 
in which these contracts are outsourced, or privatised, to competing 
enterprises within the private sector, with the intention of lowering costs 
and boosting efficiency. The efficient networked structure of modern day 
capitalism is therefore a blueprint for an efficient model of governance 
and society. The emerging modes of governance associated with this 
conceptual shift should not be confused however with a declining 
measure of governance. Neo-liberalism may be associated with “de-
governmentalisation of the state”, but surely not “de-governmentalisation” 
per se’ (Barry et al., 1996: 11).  Instead, the governance of advanced 
liberal societies needs to be understood in terms of the strategies 
increasingly being adopted from disciplines already engaged with 
questions concerning the government of dynamic systems organised in 
network form. 
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Like protocological control, neo-liberal governance is directed towards 
optimising the conditions of possibility for the self-realisation of a 
dynamic, efficient and ultimately self-governing social system. To achieve 
this, neo-liberal governmentality is directed towards fostering a certain 
subjectivity, in which the subject is “resposibilised” to make prudent 
choices concerning their own future (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2008). Indeed 
it is in the marriage of the complex, adaptive network structure of 
advanced liberal economies to a governmentality committed to optimising 
its conditions of possibility that the changing nature of biopolitical security 
needs to be understood in advanced liberal societies. Here we note the 
formation of a tight spiral in which the conceptualisation of society 
through network tropes encourages certain techniques or strategies of 
governance developed for the management of dynamic networks. In turn, 
the production of subjectivities that complement these structural forms 
also encourage their proliferation, confirming these ontopolitical 
imaginaries of species-life.   
 
When neo-liberal techniques of governance seek to encourage the self-
management of individuals and groups so as to optimise the nested, 
network structure of the modern “network society”, then the 
individualisation of risk becomes a necessary step in producing the forms 
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of subjectivity necessary for optimising the efficiency of this form of 
organisation. “Preparedness” ensures the perpetual mobilisation of the 
public in anticipation of emergent threats while the individualisation of risk 
encourages individuals and businesses to develop prudence with respect 
to their own risk and security in advanced liberal societies. But it also 
shifts the responsibility of the state away from protection, and towards 
compelling businesses and individuals to develop their own contingency 
plans and providing tools for aiding them in this endeavour. This is clearly 
witnessed within the operational logic of the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat’s policy of resilience. 
 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is not itself directly responsible for 
reorganising society upon a more resilient model, but instead seeks to 
induce resilience through optimising the conditions necessary for the self-
realisation of resilience by interested parties. This means focusing on 
building a resilient infrastructure to support emergent organisational 
structures and self-sufficiency amongst emergency responders, such as 
the development of a resilient telecommunications infrastructure through 
which critical connectivity of emergency workers can be ensured in the 
event of a crisis. But it also means encouraging a risk-responsible culture 
by promoting prudence amongst businesses and individuals in regards to 
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the management of their own individualised risk. UK Resilience, the 
website of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, provides a wealth of 
information to facilitate risk-management within the private sector. This 
includes the National Risk Register, “designed to increase awareness of 
the kinds of risks the UK faces, and encourage individuals and 
organisations to think about their own preparedness12 advice concerning 
the merits of regular risk-assessments13 and aids for the development of 
contingency plans to ensure business continuity.”14   
 
If resilience is premised upon the constitution of prudent subjects, such 
as individuals and businesses, responsible for the management of their 
own risk, then it cannot be taken for granted the degree to which security 
technologies such as resilience are facilitated by the persistent 
articulation of risk through terror alert codes, CCTV risk spaces and 
emphasis on the spectacular in the media which abound in the political 
culture of contemporary liberal societies. Here, the formulation of the “war 
on terror” in terms of a war without geographic or temporal end is both a 
product of the emphasis placed on contingency in advanced liberal 
                                         
12 “Risk” UK Resilience, http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/risk.aspx accessed 17 
August 2008.  
13 “Risk” UK Resilience, http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/risk.aspx accessed 17 
August 2008. 
14 “Business Continuity” UK Resilience, 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/businesscontinuity.aspx accessed 17 August 
2008. 
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societies as well as the source of enormous insecurity used to facilitate 
neo-liberal forms of governance (Reid, 2006: Ch. 1). Similarly, the dark 
imaginaries employed to create novel scenarios for resilience exercises, 
in a sense fold back onto reality becoming important tools for liberal 
governance aimed at “conducting the conduct” of populations through 
manipulation of their fears and insecurities (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 
468).  
 
As noted by Nietzsche in the epigraph introducing this article, this is far 
from the first time that fear has been used to garner control over a 
population. However, the relationship between risk and contingency 
within conceptualisations of the “network society” not only facilitates 
forms of neo-liberal governance seeking to “conduct the conduct” of 
populations, but similarly permits the proliferation and intensification of 
the most illiberal security technologies, such as those introduced within 
the contemporary “war on terror”, for the protection of “our liberal way of 
life”.  As such, an understanding of how contingency is hyperbolised 
within the contemporary security discourse is dependent on recognition of 
the role of contingency within contemporary conceptualisations of 
species-life in terms of a complex adaptive system and the biopolitical 
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security dispositif charged with its protection and promotion (Dillon, 
2007). 
 
Conclusion 
While security remains the foundational idea underpinning the legitimacy 
of the State, an analysis of the biopolitical security technique of resilience 
employed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat suggests a fundamental 
shift in the rationalities and techniques of security employed in 
contemporary liberal societies. Far from the prophylactic conception of 
security normally considered in academic literatures, the strategies 
aiming to engender resilience into British society are specifically tailored 
for the promotion and protection of species-life newly articulated in terms 
of a complex adaptive system. This differs considerably from the notion of 
security that Western political philosophy for centuries has promoted as 
integral to the foundation and continued legitimacy of the State (Hobbes 
and Gaskin, 1996). Rather than a device for leveraging humanity out of 
the chaos and violence encountered within the state of nature, premised 
on the idea of a protection racket, biopolitical security strategies based on 
the notion of resilience re-characterise the State as the facilitator of an 
emergency response (Dillon, 2007: 19). Here the legitimacy of the State 
rests on its capacity to provide and organise, through a mix of private, 
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public and non-profit organisations, emergency relief and planning in the 
event of a catastrophe. 
 
While this marks an important shift in the way security is understood and 
performed in advanced liberal societies, it has been considerably under 
analyzed within the security studies literature insofar as it does not fit into 
the “state/legitimate violence complex” (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) 
characteristic of traditional approaches to International Relations and 
Political Science. A biopolitical approach to these new forms of 
governance offers an analytical tool for understanding the shift in security 
rationalities and technologies characteristic of the “network society”. 
Especially in light of the “war on terror” that has hyperbolised the fear of 
low probability/high devastation threats characteristic of terrorism within 
the security discourse, an appreciation of how contingency is understood 
and employed within the biopolitical security dispositif is fundamental to 
explaining the changing nature of governance within advanced liberal 
societies.   
 
As a reflexive rationalisation of how best to govern, biopolitical 
governmentality is constantly surveying for novel strategies to optimise 
the conditions of possibility for emergent life. Advances in biotechnology, 
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which through protocological control have been increasingly able to 
manipulate the most fundamental of evolutionary life processes of the 
stem cell, have provided a model of effective governance for the “network 
society” aimed at optimising and directing the pluripotentiality of species-
life. As biopolitical security rationalities and techniques increasingly seek 
to bolster the fitness of species-life, the pluripotence of the stem cell 
represents the ideal form of heterogeneous evolutionary potential sought 
in advanced liberal societies while protocological control becomes the 
technique for optimizing the pluripotentialty of logistical life.  In advanced 
liberal societies protocological control is directed through neo-liberal 
mechanisms of governance, based fundamentally in the individuation of 
risk. 
 
As Foucault stressed, far from replacing existing modalities of 
governance, the emergence of new forms of governance tend to 
reconfigure the old to complement the new (Foucault in  Burchell et al., 
1991: 102). The analysis of risk and contingency within this paper 
suggests that the ‘governance at a distance’ characteristic of liberal 
societies is depended upon the production of a certain form of 
subjectivity, in this case, the production of prudent citizens responsible for 
their own risk-management. But where the disciplinary mechanisms 
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associated with disciplinary societies sought to produce subjects based 
upon the ideal of a homogenous “norm”, the subjectivity produced by 
contemporary governmental practices is aimed towards the constitution of 
prudent subjects able to respond to changes quickly and efficiently. This, 
in effect, produces heterogeneity in the citizenry, as would be required by 
complex “network societies” and makes governance more efficient. These 
“chains of enrolment” produce an efficient networked form of governance, 
whereby subjects, who are empowered and “resposibilised”, operate with 
a degree of autonomy from the state, while governance is dispersed 
through a mix of private and public institutions (Barry et al., 1996: 12). 
 
An examination of the techniques of governance employed by the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat clearly demonstrates how risk is being 
employed to “conduct the conduct” of subjects in advanced liberal 
societies. However, it also shows how contingency is becoming 
hyperbolised within the contemporary security environment. Indeed, as 
the war on terror has demonstrated, the contingency of international 
terrorism has induced a security environment whereby the most illiberal of 
security techniques are now being justified on account of the protection of 
“our” liberal values, and “our” liberal lives (Dillon, 2007).  The “terror of 
contingency” and the “contingency of terror” are therefore mutually 
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reinforcing to create a climate of fear that permeates the security 
discourse (Dillon, 2006) with potentially disastrous consequences for 
societies “governed through freedom” through an emphasis on risk and 
individual responsibility. 
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